Eisenhower and U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

Indeed, it was because Eisenhower pursued a insurance of containment in Vietnam that the warfarefare finally erupted.

Vietnam form _or_ system of g overnment under Eisenhower batch be summed up with two headings. First, a reluctance to actively go to war in Vietnam using the full force of the American military attack force, in spite of the circumstance that Eisenhower acknowledged the Communist threat from China in atomic number 34 Asia. This reluctance created domestic political friction within the republican Party and cause a split between those who fiercely opposed Communism and favored full-scale war with Vietnam and Eisenhower, who held corroborate for both external and internal reasons, which will be full explained.

Secondly, Eisenhower's precedence led future Administrations to the focus on form attacks rather than directing the strength of the attack on write down forces. Once the U.S. finally invaded militarily, this policy created initial setbacks in the war as the Vietnamese showed their superior land power that afterwards led to the defeat and withdrawal of American forces. Because the Vietnamese were able-bodied to hide in the jungles and sustain minimal damage, air attacks were inefficacious and the policy to send in limited land forces - a policy rooted in the Eisenhower era -- proved foolish because the strength of the Vietnamese was in their guerilla land forces and they would actually clearly demonstrate to the Americans - just as they had to the French - that the Vietnamese would not be defeat on land.

cy on Vietnam is best revealed by two world-shattering events. The first event established the political framework for his policy and that was Eisenhower's famous domino theory. The second event that revealed how his policy would be carried out is revealed in the domestic and international debate over U.S. intervention as the French were being defeated at Dienbienphu in 1954.

Understanding the domino theory and its implications for policy on containment sets the stage for understanding the event that illustrates the heart of Eisenhower's policy in Vietnam: the domestic and international debate over U.S. intervention at Dienbienphu.

The French had been fighting the communist Vietminh for years and the fighting came to its cease at a fortress on the northwestern variance of Vietnam called Dienbienphu. General Navarre, commanding the French, seriously misjudged, miscalculated and misunderstanding both the strategy and capabilities of the Vietminh army, which was under the command of General Giap. Giap had spent more than triad months deploying his men before beginning the assault and had positioned fifty guanine men at the site, with another twenty thousand set up out along his communications lines. The French, on the other hand, had unaccompanied thirteen thousand, with only about half of those qualified for combat. Unknowingly, Navarre had defeated himself before the battle of Dienbienphu ever began (Karnow 1984: 194-196).

Ridgway, in fact, believed the entire war in Indochina was a complete political and military mess. Since Eisenhower was a soldier, Ridgway decided to appeal to him soldier-to-soldier. Ridgway sent a team of planners to Vietnam to prove what it would take to achieve victory in terms of manpower. The publish that ensued, the Ridgway Report, revealed staggering numbers. Officially, the report was titled "Army Position on NSC Action No. 1074-A" and stated that, at minimum, "Seven divisions, with tolerate naval and air support, would be requir
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